Argument z Bożej ukrytości w ujęciu fenomenologicznym

Schellenberg’s argument from hiddenness of God resorts to many presuppositions and puts forward many categories of grand philosophical importance and of formidable tradition among which there are both the ones which explicitly refer to the concept of God and the ones which are related to finite personal beings. What is subsumable under the latter category is the ones of faith, guilt, resistance as well as the one of a child etc. The former categories embrace, first and foremost, the one of love, openness, hiddenness and existence. The purpose of the present paper is not a head-on polemics with Schellenberg’s argument. Rather, what is at stake is to follow Schellenberg’s argumentation and illuminate its sense and the possibility of applying in philosophico-theological considerations these above-mentioned fundamental categories. The means to this end is a phenomenological description of hiddenness, openness and existence. The obtained results are of positive nature. Namely, they indicate in which sense the said categories are justified while philosophizing over God and in which sense they are not. It is only via the results obtained due to the phenomenological scrutiny over openness, hiddenness and existence that it becomes clear to what extent Schellenberg’s argument is founded upon solid grounds, the measure of which is not, after all, the arbitrariness of adopted hypothesis or the formal coherence of argumentation, but rather – keeping as close to reality as possible. It is only at this point; that is, on the fringes of the reflection supported by phenomenological insights, that the ways of critical assessment of Schellenberg’s conception become available.