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Tytuł pozycji:

Russian-ukrainian war as the strategy of Ukrainian statehood destruction

Tytuł:
Russian-ukrainian war as the strategy of Ukrainian statehood destruction
Російсько-українська війна як стратегія знищення української державності
Autorzy:
Poiarkova, Tetiana
Tematy:
Russian-Ukrainian war,
hybrid war,
conflicts of low intensity,
“new war”,
second front
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe w Żytomierzu
Język:
angielski
Prawa:
CC BY-NC: Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne 4.0
Źródło:
Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona; 2017, 7; 114-120
2312-8933
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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In the article the problem to determine the nature, peculiarities of origin and means to overcome military conflicts like Russian-Ukrainian war (have been continuing since 2014) is studied. Modern scientific approaches to understanding of modern wars’ essence such as the theory of “hybrid wars”, “conflicts of low intensity”, “privatized wars”, рost-modern conflict and degenerate warfare are analyzed. Special attention is given to M. Kaldor’s conception of “new war” and the unusual character of modern wars is emphasized, when elements of partisan confrontation and international warring parties are combined. In reality it is impossible to distinguish civilian population from warring parties. A very important feature is the formation of new forces, which are decentralized and consist of many different types (para-military secessionist units, local field commanders, mercenaries and regular armies). The author gives special consideration to such nuance of Russian-Ukrainian war as the destruction of Ukrainian statehood by the Russian Federation (RF) using not only the external front but the inner one. In the article the influence of the RF on home Ukrainian problems is proposed to study in three projections: political, economic and cultural. At the same time the accent is made on the RF’s using of democratic Ukrainian procedures and institutions for Russia’s benefit. As to the economic component, Russia holds an interest in creating of additional expenses for Ukraine because of: 1) population that in fact is in occupation (social services: pensions, indemnities for health and home losses, etc.); 2) destruction of infrastructure in occupied regions; 3) works in territories under the RF’s control. The cultural changes, which help Russia in the war confrontation, are emphasized. Firstly, it is the formation of a separate regional identity (prevailing over the state one) in the occupied territories. Secondly, there are strained relations (between Russians and Ukrainians, parishioners of the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchate, age strata, etc.). Thirdly, gradual destruction of “new” Ukrainian heroes’ (soldier of Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO)) images is conducted. Fourthly, they consolidate negative images of local population of the ‘LPR’-‘DPR’, who couldn’t defend the independence of their region and now make additional budgetary loadings. Reasons of Russia entry into the war against Ukraine are also analyzed in the article. These reasons are: overdependence of Russian economic system from external world, fatal developmental scientific lag. The author indicates that concentration of social attention on the war let mobilize Russian society to struggle against common enemy, level the aftermath of hydrocarbon era and inevitable social and economic polarization of Russian society. The following aspects are treated by the author as the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: 1) compensation of total government ownership and encroachment on rights ands freedoms of Russian citizens by means of felling like “the great nation” as the result of the of Ukrainian territory seizure (the Crimea); 2) creation of a precedent to reconsider post-World War II agreements. In the conclusions of the article it is indicated that the most acceptable for the RF variant of further Russian-Ukrainian conflict is its tailing. The existence of the “grey zone” (the ‘LPR and the ‘DPR’) is advantageous in long-term perspective: to make up economic losses; to draw dividends from the opportunity to influence Ukraine the opportunities to reallocate areas of influence in world politics.

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